This paper focuses on monetary policy in China. A set of di¤erent speci…cations for the monetary policy reaction function are empirically evaluated using monthly data for 1999-2012. Variation is allowed both in the policy targets as well as in the monetary policy instrument itself. Overall, the performance of the estimated policy rules is surprisingly good. Chinese monetary policy displays countercyclical reactions to in ‡ation and leaning-against-the-wind behaviour. The paper shows that there is a notable increase in the overall responsiveness of Chinese monetary policy over the course of the estimation period. The central bank interest rate is irresponsive to economic conditions during the earlier years of the sample but does respond in the later years. This …nding supports the view that the monetary policy settings of the People's Bank of China have come to place more weight on price-based instruments. A time-varying estimation procedure suggests that the two monetary policy objectives are assigned to di¤erent instruments. The money supply instrument is utilised to control the price level and (after 2008) the interest rate instrument has been used to achieve the targeted output growth.
Introduction
China's central bank, the People's Bank of China (PBC), states that the objective of its policy is 'to maintain stability of the value of the currency and thereby promote economic growth' 1 . The central bank uses various instruments to achieve this objective. These include some unconventional instruments such as, the window guidance policy and the use of required reserve ratio as an active policy tool.
In conjunction with modernising and opening up a previously centrally planned economy, the conduct of monetary policy in China has experienced major changes. Interest rate liberalization is a fairly recent development in China. Therefore, one might assume that over time -with the emergence of the interest rate channel in the economy -the central bank interest rate will become a more e¤ective policy instrument. The majority of the existing literature on Chinese monetary policy still …nds the interest rate to be ine¤ective, and usually advocates the use of quantity-based instruments.
Typically, monetary policy reaction functions estimated for China take the form of traditional Taylor (1993) or McCallum (1988) rules. These rules are used to assess either the monetary policy stance over time or the e¤ectiveness of the selected rule in achieving the ultimate goal of monetary policy. In this study, we address this issue from a di¤erent perspective. Rather than using a predetermined form of the policy rule, we concentrate on …nding a speci…cation of the central bank reaction function that is best supported by the data. This is done by empirically evaluating a variety of possible policy reaction functions with di¤erent policy instruments: price-based interest rate versus quantity-based money supply. We analyse the McCallum and Taylor rules as well as some hybrid rules combining their features. We estimate several di¤erent speci…cations in each of these categories taking into account the PBC's possible adherence to exchange rate stability.
Our study follows the approach of Patra and Kapur (2012) for India, Mehrotra and Sánchez-Fung (2011) for emerging market economies and Fan et al. (2011) for China. Our paper di¤ers from Fan et al. (ibid.) in that we study a more recent period, include a wider variety of possible policy reaction functions, and utilize monthly data to obtain more observations. We focus mainly on the change in monetary policy responsiveness in China over time. The many market-based reforms successfully carried out during the recent decades a¤ord presumptive evidence that central bank policy too has gone through a process of change. One question we are addressing is whether or not the economic progress in China has already reached a state where monetary policy can be credibly modelled using an interest rate as the policy instrument.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section gives a theory review of monetary policy rules and a short summary of the most relevant recent empirical work. Section three brie ‡y goes through the recent developments in China's monetary policy. The data are described in section four. Section …ve begins the empirical part of the paper by estimating the contemporaneous rules for China. In section six, we focus on changes in monetary policy reactions by estimating the policy rule parameters over time. The single-equation analysis is expanded in section seven to the analysis of vector autoregressive (VAR) models for the policy rules. Finally, section eight concludes.
Monetary policy rules 2.1 Theoretical review
The McCallum rule originates from the works of McCallum (1988 McCallum ( , 2000 and is based on the idea that the central bank should adjust the nominal money supply in response to nominal output deviations from the desired path. In the event that nominal output grows at the desired target rate, 1 http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/970/index.html 2 money supply growth should equal the targeted nominal growth rate for the economy. The original rule (McCallum 1988 (McCallum , 2000 is
where b t is the growth of monetary-base at time t and x t and x t are the log growth rates of actual and target nominal output, respectively. v a t denotes the average change in base-money velocity over the previous four years. This variable is included in the original rule to serve as a forecast for long-lasting regulatory and technological changes a¤ecting the velocity of money over the foreseeable future. Parameter measures the strength of the feedback adjustment in response to departures of output from its target path. The value of should be positive if policy responses are countercyclical. For the U.S. economy, McCallum suggests a feedback parameter value of 0.5; for emerging economies, recent empirical studies …nd values of ranging from negative to higher than one (e.g. Mehrotra & Sánchez-Fung 2011; Patra & Kapur 2012) .
Contrary to the McCallum rule, the Taylor rule (Taylor 1993 ) accounts separately for changes in real output and prices. The rule supposes that the central bank reacts to deviations of in ‡ation from its target rate and real output from the long-run trend, using the steering rate i t as the policy instrument. The original rule (Taylor 1993 ) was designed to re ‡ect U.S. monetary policy of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and is speci…ed as i t = (i + t ) + 0:5b y t + 0:5( t ).
In (2), b y t is the output gap at time t, measured as the log of real GDP less its trend, and ( t t ) is the excess of actual in ‡ation over the target in ‡ation rate. In the event that in ‡ation and output are at their equilibrium values, the central bank steering rate in real terms corresponds to the equilibrium real interest rate i . Values other than 0:5 for the output and in ‡ation gap coe¢ cients have also been used frequently. The relative magnitudes of the coe¢ cients re ‡ect the tradeo¤ between central bank objectives: output versus in ‡ation stabilization. For the 'Taylor principle' to hold, the overall coe¢ cient for in ‡ation should be larger than one. This assures the rule's stabilization properties: the steering rate should be increased in real terms in the event of rising prices.
One drawback in using the Taylor rule is that the current-period output gap cannot be observed. To overcome the measurement error problem in determining the trend or natural rate of output, some authors suggest that the original Taylor rule (2) should be speci…ed in di¤erence form. The estimated Taylor reactions in this paper are more in line with the following 'di¤erence rule', proposed by Orphanides and Williams (2007) :
This formulation takes into account policy smoothing behavior in the lagged policy instrument with a weight 0 i < 1. McCallum (2000) argues that there is no apparent reason for the policy instruments and target variables to be paired in any particular combinations. The hybrid rules, then, can be expressed as
In (5), the parameter > 0 is the policy feedback parameter, similar to in (1) but now measuring the strength of adjustment in the interest rate. Already Taylor (1979) speci…ed an optimal policy rule in terms of responses to the in ‡ation and output gaps in the nominal money supply similar to (4). Hall and Mankiw (1994) introduced the concept of 'hybrid target'for monetary policy. In equation (4) this is the last term in square brackets. McCallum and Nelson (1999) …nd that for U.S. data from the mid-1950s to the mid-1990s nominal income targeting with a type of hybrid McCallum and Taylor rule (5) performs reasonably well.
While the Taylor rule has gained prominence in contemporary macroeconomics, quantity-based rules have been shown to be successful in describing monetary policy in certain environments. These include emerging markets, where the market environment is less developed (see Taylor 2001) , as well as in situations where the interest rate rule is problematic because of its zero lower bound limit (see McCallum 2003).
Previous results on emerging markets
Patra and Kapur (2012) evaluate the empirical performance of McCallum and Taylor rules, as well as the two hybrid rules for India. The authors also estimate forward-looking formulations of the rules and …nd that the forward-looking versions do outperform contemporaneous and backward-looking rules in the Indian context.
Mehrotra and Sánchez-Fung (2011) estimate the Taylor and McCallum rules as well as hybrid rules for 20 emerging economies. Their country set, however, does not include China. For the 14 in ‡ation-targeting economies, the authors …nd that the hybrid McCallum-Taylor speci…cation is superior to the traditional Taylor rule, whereas the results are mixed for the six monetary or exchange rate targeting economies.
In a preceding paper Mehrotra and Sánchez-Fung (2010) estimate a hybrid McCallum-Taylor policy reaction function for China for 1994-2008. Using vector autoregressions, the study …nds a stabilizing monetary policy reaction to the output gap, but in terms of the in ‡ation gap the policy reaction is procyclical. The analysis is also extended to allow reactions to expected future in ‡ation by adding a survey-based in ‡ation-expectations metric to the estimation. This results in a restrictive policy response to increases in in ‡ation expectations, while responses to both the in ‡ation and output gaps are procyclical.
Following a similar method, Fan et al. (2011) estimate a Taylor rule and a 'generalized McCallum rule' (similar to the hybrid McCallum-Hall-Mankiw rule in our analysis) for China. The overall …nding is that the rules are able to capture monetary policy responses to the in ‡ation gap and output gap, but the magnitude of responses is much smaller than the ones observed for market economies. In addition to …xed coe¢ cient models, time varying coe¢ cients are also estimated. The time-varying models are found to better describe the behaviour of policy instruments in 1992-2009. The time varying coe¢ cients for the in ‡ation gap in the Taylor rule, however, show no permanent change over the estimation period.
Our paper extends the study of Fan et al. (2011) by analysing also the nominal policy rules sometimes claimed to be more appropriate for emerging economies. We also study a more recent time period in which the monetary policy environment has become more market-oriented. In addition, our study utilizes monthly data frequency, allowing for more observations.
There are few other papers exploiting monetary policy rules to study the recent monetary policy in China. Burdekin and Siklos (2008) 
Monetary policy in China
Unlike the central banks in many advanced economies, the PBC does not operate in a singleinstrument environment, nor in an in ‡ation-targeting framework. Instead, the PBC uses a variety of policy instruments including both price-based as well as quantity-based and administrative policy measures. The policy is formally aimed at two main objectives: economic growth and stable prices. In addition to domestic price stability, the PBC also deals with exchange rate stability. Monetary policy in China also has …scal goals, such as job creation and providing …nancial support for di¤erent sectors or areas.
Monetary policy is implemented in conjunction with the annual economic development targets set by the National Development and Reform Commission. Explicit targets are set for in ‡ation and GDP growth. In addition, an annual target for the broad money (M2) growth is set as the predominant intermediate policy target. The PBC claims that by controlling money growth it can 'promote economic growth positively and contribute to preventing both in ‡ation and de ‡ation' (PBC 2005) .
Deepening of the economic and …nancial reforms in China in recent years has created a need for a more market-oriented monetary policy framework. Until 1997, the PBC controlled credit and money directly, and monetary policy was mainly implemented through credit plans. An indirect policy management framework was adopted in 1998, and a reserve requirement ratio, open market operations and central bank lending have been introduced as the main policy tools.
The PBC has gradually developed price-based monetary tools such as interest rates. The central bank sets a series of benchmark interest rates, including rates on required and excess reserves, rediscounting rate and benchmark deposit and lending rates of di¤erent maturities. Interest rate policy is still under development in China and, for example, there is no short-term rate to anchor policy expectations. The PBC benchmark deposit and loan rates are currently considered the main policy interest rates in China.
The …nancial system liberalization has also added to the demand for a more price-based policy. The market-based interest rate reform started with money and bond market rates, which were largely liberalized in 1996-1998. The banking sector retail rate liberalization, however, has proceeded more gradually. Banks have been allowed to adjust interest rates o¤ered to their customers within a limited band around the PBC benchmark deposit and lending rates. The ceiling for commercial bank lending rates and the ‡oor for deposit rates were abolished in 2004. The ‡oating bands whitin which banks can set their retail lending and deposit rates have also been gradually widened.
A prominent feature of the PBC's monetary policy over the estimation period has been the exchange rate controls. The Chinese yuan has been more or less directly begged to the U.S. dollar from 1995 to 2005 and again during the …nancial crisis in 2008-2010. Capital controls, however, are considered to have been largely binding during the period of controlled exchange rates, which renders the monetary policy to be utilized at domestic purposes. After 2010, the PBC has reduced the volume of forex interventions and increased exchange rate ‡exibility.
Data
We use monthly data for the period 1998m1-2012m10. Sample selection is based on the timing of the market-based reforms in China. Year 1998 marks the start of the …fth phase of economic reforms, in which monetary policy underwent signi…cant changes. These include the abolishment of credit plans and adoption of open market operations. The dual-track exchange rate system had been abandoned in 1994. In addition, our sample period leaves out the most volatile periods of Asian …nancial crises. All the data are from Thomson Datastream, Bloomberg or People's Bank of China websites (www.pbc.gov.cn). A list of utilized data series and their original sources is given in Appendix 1.
The policy instruments considered are nominal interest rate and annual growth rates of the monetary aggregates: base money (reserve money) and broad money (M2). The interest rate variable is the o¢ cial PBC one-year benchmark lending rate. 2 For a measure of base money, we use the data series 'reserve money'from IMF International Financial Statistics. 3 We use a number of di¤erent formulations for the monetary policy target variables. Two in ‡ation measures are used: consumer price index (CPI) and corporate goods price index (CGPI). In ‡ation rates are percentage changes in the corresponding price indices from the same month of the previous year. In ‡ation gaps are calculated by removing the Hodrick-Prescott-…ltered trend from the in ‡ation series. In addition, the o¢ cial target CPI growth rate, annually set by the Central Economic Working Conference, is used in calculating in ‡ation deviation from targeted rate. Mehrotra and Sánchez-Fung (2010) also use o¢ cial CPI targets to derive the in ‡ation gap. Consumer price in ‡ation deviation is the actual in ‡ation less the o¢ cial target rate. For CGPI in ‡ation, the target growth rate is calculated from the o¢ cial CPI growth target, and the deviation from target is derived accordingly. 4 In calculating the output gap in China, we use the monthly industrial production index. Annual output growth is based on the industrial production index, adjusted for the Chinese New Year. 5 Following Mehrotra & Sánchez-Fung (2010), the output gap is de…ned by applying the HodrickPrescott …lter to annual growth rates of industrial production. Output growth deviation from the target rate, obtained from the o¢ cial GDP growth target announced by the Central Economic Working Conference, is used as an alternative measure of the output gap. 6 Nominal output gap, which is needed in an analysis of McCallum-type rules, is derived similarly to the real output gap. The nominal annual output growth is the sum of real annual output growth and annual corporate goods price in ‡ation. In the derivation of nominal output deviation from target, the target rate for nominal output growth is the sum of the targets for real output growth and CGPI in ‡ation. The measures of the output and in ‡ation gaps are compared in …gure A2 in Appendix 2.
Broad money growth is the most prominent intermediate target for monetary policy in China. Therefore, the o¢ cial target growth rate is added to the set of explanatory variables in the money growth instrument rules. 7 The last group of monetary policy target variables includes the alternative metrics of the exchange rate. We utilize the trade-weighted real e¤ective exchange rate (REER) and the nominal e¤ective exchange rate (NEER). The exchange rate measure is the log change in the REER/NEER index from the same month previous year. We also account for the possibility that monetary policy reacts to exchange rate variations from the trend path itself. The exchange rate gaps are again 2 PBC benchmark lending rates of other maturities, benchmark deposit rates and deposit and loan rates of personal housing provident funds are adjusted correspondingly together with the one-year benchmark lending rate. 3 IMF's reserve money series represents currency in circulation as well as central-bank deposits of banks and other residents, excluding the central government. 4 Target for CGPI in ‡ation is derived from CPI growth target: cgpi = 1:65 cpi 1:40. The constant and coe¢ cient values are obtained by regressing actual CGPI in ‡ation on actual CPI in ‡ation. 5 The January and February …gures for industrial production are a¤ected by the Chinese New Year, and since 2007 the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics has stopped publishing the industrial production …gures for January. Throughout the sample, we adjust the data by using the average values for January and February in both of these months. 6 The Central Economic Working Conference sets targets only for GDP growth. To obtain a target for industrial production growth, we …rst regress annual industrial production growth on GDP growth (using quarterly data for 1998q1 -2012 q2). The results give: IP = 1:33 GDP . Target growth rate for industrial production is set to 1.33 times the o¢ cial GDP growth target. 7 For reserve money, no o¢ cial growth target is announced. Broad money supply, by de…nition, equals the money multiplier (mm ) times base money supply. To derive the target growth rate for reserve money, we utilize this relationship and express the reserve money growth target as b
, where the last term is the Hodrick-Prescott trend growth rate in the money multiplier. This approach can be justi…ed by the fact that the PBC states that regulating the base money supply enables it to meet its broad money target (PBC 2008). 6 calculated by removing the HP-…ltered trend from the exchange rate series.
All the growth rates are calculated as year-on-year bases and are not seasonally adjusted. The utilized data series are depicted in …gures A1 and A2 in Appendix 2. The summary statistics and unit root test statistics are given in table A2.
Lastly, we take into account the possibility that the responsiveness of the policy interest rate and money supply may be di¤erent in periods when reserve requirement ratio changes are actively used as a policy tool. We create a dummy variable to account for these periods. Detailed information about the dummy variable for reserve requirement ratio increases is given in Appendix 3.
Empirical estimation of the contemporaneous models
To provide a …rst glance at the performance of the di¤erent policy rules, we estimate the following set of contemporaneous policy reaction functions. 8 These model formulations nest the original policy rules as presented in section 2.1. 9
McCallum:
Hybrid McCallum-Hall-Mankiw:
Taylor:
Hybrid McCallum-Taylor:
In the original literature, McCallum (1988) speci…ed the model to react to variables that prevailed in the previous period, whereas in Taylor's work the policy reactions are speci…ed taking into account the current period variables. Therefore the lag structure di¤ers somewhat as between the model speci…cations.
In (6) and (7), index i refers to the two monetary aggregates considered: reserve money (rm) and broad money (M 2). Throughout the estimations, the two measures of nominal and real output gaps, ( x x ) and ( y y ), respectively, are considered: HP-…ltered series and output growth deviation from the target rate. Similarly, the same measures of the CPI and CGPI in ‡ation gaps ( ) are taken into account. Note that all the models are speci…ed so that the parameters for output and in ‡ation gaps are assumed to be positive. In other words, one would expect expansionary monetary policy at such times when growth falls behind the long run target value. The nominal (real) exchange rate measure is used in the policy rules speci…ed for nominal (real) variables. As an alternative measure for exchange rate change ( e), the exchange rate gap term (b e) is tested in all the estimations. Policy smoothing behavior is accounted for by the lagged value of the policy instrument. All reactions are estimated using ordinary least squares estimation.
Tables 1-4 present the estimation results of 'contemporaneous'formulations. This means that in the McCallum (table 1) and hybrid McCallum- Taylor (table 4) rules, the estimations are conducted by using the previous-period values of the policy variables. In the Taylor rule (table 3) and the  hybrid McCallum-Hall-Mankiw (table 2) reactions, monetary policy settings are assumed to take into account the current period variables. The exchange rate measure is included in the estimation if it is statistically signi…cant. Similarly, the dummy variable indicating periods of rapid RRR increase (discussed in Appendix 3) is included, if it appears to be statistically signi…cant. Interaction between the dummy variable and other target variables was also tested, but these e¤ects were statistically insigni…cant in all the speci…cations.
In addition, the sample is divided into two sub-periods. The 'best'contemporaneous speci…ca-tions are estimated also for the sub-periods. The data are divided into periods before and after 2007. The division is based on the CUSUM of squares test, which points to possible parameter instability during the period from end of 2006 to start of 2007 for money supply rules estimated on the whole sample period. To be able to compare the di¤erent rules, interest rate rules are also divided into the same sub-periods. The next section presents the rolling estimations of policy parameters and analyses of changes in the responsiveness of policy in more detail.
Turning to the estimation results, the contemporaneous McCallum rule reactions (table 1) clearly indicate the problematic nature of the reserve money measure. The reserve requirement ratio (RRR) increases that occur in times of policy tightening cause the reserve money aggregate to increase, contrary to its role as a stabilizing policy instrument (see Appendix 3 for details). Therefore, reserve money growth reacts negatively to nominal output deviation. Figures A3 and A4 in Appendix 3 con…rm that RRR hikes have accelerated the reserve money growth at times when M2 growth has been slowing down. Not surprisingly, the dummy variable is also signi…cant in the McCallum estimations for reserve money, but not for M2. Nonetheless, the dummy variable does not adequately account for the RRR's in ‡uence on reserve money.
Broad money, then, seems to be a more appropriate monetary aggregate for policy analysis, although it is not directly controllable by the monetary authority. The M2 aggregate is also the predominant intermediate target for the Chinese central bank. Indeed, the estimated McCallum rules for M2 perform remarkably well. The estimated reactions to nominal output deviation get the expected sign in all speci…cations. The long-run coe¢ cient of nominal output deviation from trend is 0:40 0:60 for models 3 and 4 (table 1). These are close to the parameter values suggested in McCallum's work (0:25 to 0:50). It is interesting that in all speci…cations the target growth rate for money b is strongly signi…cant, replacing the constant term in the estimated functions. The numerical value, nonetheless, is clearly less than one.
The hybrid McCallum-Hall-Mankiw rule is the other policy rule studied here, in which the money supply serves as the policy instrument. The estimation results presented in table 2 su¤er again from the same problem as the McCallum rule results with the reserve money aggregate. In all the estimates of equation (7) for reserve money the coe¢ cients of in ‡ation are negative. On the contrary, in the models, where M2 is the policy instrument, the reactions to in ‡ation gap are statistically signi…cant and correctly signed. The magnitudes of the responses are also rather high. The long-run coe¢ cients are around 1:40 for models 7 and 8. The second notable feature is that even with the broad money measure, the money supply seems not to react to the output gap. In the single occasion, where the output gap is statistically signi…cant (model 9), the parameter estimate has a negative sign.
In Mehrotra & Sánchez-Fung (2010) the monetary base is used as the only money supply measure in estimating similar kinds of hybrid McCallum-Hall-Mankiw reactions. The …ndings are consistent with ours when reserve money is used as the policy instrument. Our results indicate, however, that broad money would be a preferable aggregate and, contrary to base money, the results for M2 are largely in line with theoretical assumptions. Our results are also broadly similar to those of Fan et al. (2011) , who use the in ‡ation rate, instead of the in ‡ation gap, in their policy simulations. Taking into account the policy smoothing behavior, however, our estimations produce larger policy responses to in ‡ation. This provides further evidence that the money supply has actually become more responsive to in ‡ation during the more recent estimation period.
The Taylor rule reactions are reported in table 3 . The rules perform well in terms of the signs of the in ‡ation deviation and output deviation terms. Both are positive, as expected. The parameter coe¢ cients, however, are smaller than Taylor's suggested ones and thus violate the 'Taylor principle'. The long-run coe¢ cients of the in ‡ation gap are around 0:10 0:30 and for the output gap around 0:20 0:40. When the exchange rate gap is added to the contemporaneous equations, reactions to the in ‡ation and output gaps become smaller and statistically less signi…cant (see models 11 and 14) . An interesting observation in the Taylor rule estimations is that the interest rate has become much more responsive to the in ‡ation and output gaps in recent times (models 10 and 13). At the same time, the past interest rate level has become less important.
Mehrotra and Sánchez-Fung (2010) also investigate the possibility of using the interest rate as a policy instrument. They …nd that the Taylor Comparing the results from the two sub-samples in models 16-18, the same conclusion as for the Taylor rule can be drawn: The central bank interest rate has become more responsive to macroeconomic variables after 2006. These results indicate that Chinese monetary policy implementation is moving towards placing more weight on price-based policy tools. The next section further studies the behavior of policy reactions over time.
In line with the empirical policy rules literature, policy smoothing behavior is evident in all the speci…cations. The estimated interest rate reactions, however, show much stronger policy smoothing than the money supply reactions. In interpreting the results for interest rate rules, it should be borne in mind that the interest rate is rarely altered (the policy interest rate is depicted in …gure A4 in Appendix 3), which may a¤ect the results. Especially in some Taylor rule speci…cations, the AR-coe¢ cient for the previous period value of interest rate is close to unity. In addition, the estimation results show that, overall, the inclusion of an exchange rate measure does not notably a¤ect the results. This …nding is in line with the previous literature.
Based on the estimated model speci…cations (not all presented), it can be concluded that, overall, there seems to be very little di¤erence in whether the HP-…lter or the o¢ cial target rate is utilized in calculating the in ‡ation and output gap measures. Further, the estimation results remain largely robust to the use of CPI or CGPI in ‡ation measures. We rely on these …ndings in the remaining of this paper, and focus only on the HP-…ltered gap series, when estimating policy rule parameters in a rolling window. 
Rolling estimations
The estimation results in the previous section suggest that there is likely to be a change in the responsiveness of the monetary policy instruments over time. In this section, this change is studied in more detail. We estimate the di¤erent contemporaneous monetary policy response functions in a rolling window. We choose a four-year window (48 observations) to be able to timely detect any changes in policy conduct. 10 In the rolling estimations we only consider the broad money (M2) aggregate, because of the problems with the reserve money aggregate (base money) discussed in the previous section. In order to make the results based on di¤erent monetary policy rules more comparable with each other, this section uses the HP-detrended consumer price in ‡ation as the in ‡ation measure 11 and real and nominal HP-detrended industrial production as the measure for output deviation. Similarly, the exchange rate measure is the HP-detrended nominal or real e¤ective exchange rate gap. The equations estimated are as follows:
Hybrid McCallum-Hall-Mankiw : b
Taylor :
Hybrid McCallum-Taylor :
Parameter superscripts l refer to the di¤erent sub-periods. The …rst lag of the policy instrument is added to the right-hand-side to account for the policy smoothing behavior. Note that because of the original design of these rules (see section 2) the 'Taylor-type'rules (equations 11 and 12) employ the contemporaneous policy target variables, whereas the 'McCallum-type'rules (equations 10 and 13) use the …rst lags of these variables. 12 The data for the rolling estimations start at 1998m1 and the …rst parameter estimate using the previous four-year data is for 2002m12. At each step of the estimation, the rolling window is moved one month forward and the parameter estimates, their standard errors, and other test statistics are re-estimated. Proceeding in this way to the end of the data sample, 2012m10, we get 119 di¤erent four-year windows for which the policy parameters are estimated.
In the rolling estimations, only data that are available at the time of the estimation are utilized in calculating the parameter estimates. This means that the Hodrick-Prescott-…ltered gap series are recalculated at each estimation step. The HP-…ltering is performed at each step using data starting from 1998m1 up to the end of the estimation period in question. 13 Figure 1 presents the rolling McCallum rule (eq. 10) parameter estimates and their 90% con…dence intervals. The broad money supply has reacted statistically signi…cantly to the nominal output gap roughly during the period mid-2005 -2007 and again from mid-2010 to the end of the 1 0 Also a …ve-year (60-month) rolling window is tested, and the results are in line with those for a four-year window. 1 1 In addition, the robustness of the results is tested by selecting the corporate goods prices as the price measure. These results proved to be largely similar to those for the consumer price measure (see Appendix 4). 1 2 The estimation results show that the dummy variable for frequent RRR hikes is not relevant in the rolling estimations. This is likely due to the fact that broad money (M2) supply is only moderately a¤ected by the reserve requirement ratio changes. For further analysis between the relationship of RRR and broad money supply see Ma et al. (2013) . 1 3 To study the robustness of this method, we have also carried out the rolling parameter estimations with data where the HP-…ltering is conducted for the entire data sample prior to the rolling estimations. These estimation results (not presented here) are very similar to the ones with the rolling HP-…ltering. sample period. The nominal e¤ective exchange rate (NEER) gap is not signi…cant for the McCallum rule in any of the sub-samples. The probability of the hypothesis that the NEER gap variable is omitted from the estimated equations is never below 10%. Therefore, the rolling McCallum rule parameters are estimated also by assuming that the policy does not react to the exchange rate. The McCallum rule estimation results without the NEER gap are presented in …gure 2. Again, the broad money supply has been responsive to the nominal output gap at 90% level of con…dence in almost all the sub-samples, apart from the …rst year of estimation and a short period in late 2008. The reactions for the negative output gap are positive. This is in line with the theory: at times when the nominal output falls behind its trend, the broad money supply is increased. The policy smoothing behavior has been persistent over time. Figure 3 shows the rolling estimation results for the second money supply rule, the Hybrid McCallum-Hall-Mankiw rule (eq. 11). The results o¤er interesting insights into the previous McCallum-rule estimates. First of all, as the broad money supply does not seem to be responsive to the output gap, the reactions to the nominal output gap in the McCallum rule are mainly driven by reactions to the in ‡ation gap. Reactions to the in ‡ation gap in the Hybrid McCallum-Hall-Mankiw rule are similar to the reactions to nominal output gap in the McCallum rule.
The real e¤ective exchange rate (REER) shows not to be signi…cant at the 90% level in the majority of the sub-samples. The Hybrid McCallum-Hall-Mankiw estimation results without the exchange rate are presented in …gure 4. The output gap remains largely insigni…cant, except for a short period in early 2006, where the reaction to the negative output gap is strangely negative, which is at odds with the theory. The policy smoothing in the central bank broad money supply is strong, but appears to recede towards the end of the estimation sample, along with a rising signi…cance of the o¢ cial target for the broad money growth in the central bank broad money supply. In addition to the consumer price in ‡ation, the rolling estimations are carried out using the corporate goods price index (CGPI) as the price measure. The corporate goods prices can be seen to be more closely related to industrial production, which is our output measure. The results using the CGPI in ‡ation are presented in …gure A5 in Appendix 4. The …gure con…rms the …ndings from the previous section that the policy responses to consumer price changes are very similar to the policy responses to corporate goods prices.
Rolling parameter estimates with the 90% con…dence bounds for the Taylor rule (eq. 12) are presented in …gure 5. The …gure shows that before 2008 the PBC benchmark lending rate has not been responsive to any of the macroeconomic variables. During 2008 -2010 the interest rate policy reacted to the output gap but not to consumer prices.
The results of the rolling estimation are similar to those in the previous section, where we found that adding the exchange rate variable to the Taylor rule renders the other policy variables statistically less signi…cant. Because the real e¤ective exchange rate (REER) gap is statistically signi…cant only for a short period in late In all the Taylor rule estimations the policy smoothing parameter is very large, at times greater than one. The interest rates remain very persistent, despite the fact that the policy has become more responsive to changes in output from its trend level. The likely explanation for this is that, even though the PBC lending rates have been more frequently altered in the recent years, the policy rate remains a more infrequently used policy instrument, compared to many others (including RRR hikes to alter the monetary base). Figure 7 depicts the rolling parameter estimates for the last estimated policy rule, the Hybrid McCallum-Taylor interest rate rule (eq. 13). Here the Taylor rule in ‡ation and output gaps are replaced by the nominal output deviation. The estimation results show that the PBC benchmark lending rate has responded statistically signi…cantly to the nominal output gap only in a few months in late 2008. The exchange rate gap, on the other hand, has been statistically signi…cant at the 90% level for the interest rate setting from the start of 2009. As with the Taylor rule, however, the policy smoothing parameter again exhibits values that are very high. For comparison, the Hybrid McCallum Taylor rule is also estimated without the exchange rate variable, even though it is statistically signi…cant in all the sub-samples in the more recent years. These results are presented in …gure 8. The exclusion of the exchange rate does not seem to drastically change the policy responses to the nominal output gap in the Hybrid McCallum Taylor rule.
It is clear that monetary policy in China is conducted using a variety of policy instruments. What remains unclear is the way the instruments are chosen to achieve the policy targets. In addition to multiple instruments, the …nal goal for policy is also twofold. The objective of monetary policy in China is to control prices, but at the same time also contribute to economic growth. The rolling policy parameter estimations, presented in this section, provide many interesting insights into PBC policy settings and selections from among the di¤erent instruments. First of all, it seems clear that roughly after 2008 the policy has been set so that the interest rate instrument is used to control real economic activity. The policy interest rate is raised in times of overheating (when output is above trend rate) and lowered in periods of a slowdown (when output falls below trend). The quantity-based money supply instrument is reserved for restraining in ‡ation. When in ‡ation is below trend or target level the money supply has been relatively expansive, and in times of rising in ‡ation it has been tightened.
Secondly, the …ndings show a clear change in the policy setting pattern. The interest rate became responsive to changes in output after 2008m4. This results from the advances in the market-based interest rate reform, whereby the policy rates have also been harnessed to function as a more timely instrument. During 2007 there were signs of economic overheating in China, and the PBC had to tighten its policy stance. This changed in 2008, following the global …nancial turmoil, and the policy had to be rapidly loosened. In this environment the policy interest rates were also used more actively than before.
Thirdly, the results suggested that di¤erent policy instruments are used to control real economic activity and price stability. Therefore the nominal policy rules for China cannot optimally account for this behavior. Nominal output merges the changes in real output and prices and is therefore a poor target variable, if one wants to detect policy actions that are directed only towards one of these. 
20
In the …nal section of this paper, the policy rules are estimated in a vector autoregressive (VAR) setting. This section shows the dynamic linkages between the instruments and the policy target variables. As in the earlier section, to make the results more compatible, we only use the HP-…ltered variables for the gap series and choose the broad money (M2) as our monetary aggregate. The optimal lag order in all the VAR speci…cations is based on the …nal prediction error information criterion with a maximum of 12 lags. To reduce the number of parameters to be estimated, the least signi…cant parameter coe¢ cients are eliminated. The model is re-estimated at each step of the elimination, always removing the coe¢ cient with a lowest t-value, until all the remaining parameters are statistically signi…cant at the 90% level. All the estimations are carried out using data for the 1999m1 -2012m10 period.
The McCallum rule VAR is estimated using three lags. The …nal estimated model, after eliminating the insigni…cant coe¢ cients, is 
where t is a 3 1 vector containing the residuals. 
The estimated reduced-form Taylor rule VAR is X t 
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The impulse responses for the Taylor rule are presented in …gure 11. A one-time shock to in ‡ation induces a future hike in the central bank interest rate. In line with the theory, an opposite movement in the interest rate follows after a positive shock to the real e¤ective exchange rate. On the other hand, shocks to the output gap seem not to have a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the future interest rate. This is more in line with earlier studies that …nd the output gap often statistically insigni…cant in Taylor (17) Figure 12 shows the impulse responses for this model. A shock to the nominal output will slightly increase the future level of the interest rate. Again, an opposite e¤ect on the interest rate is observed when the nominal e¤ective exchange rate is hit by a shock.
Overall, all the estimated VAR models are in line with theoretical assumptions and broadly con…rm our previous results from the single-equation analysis. The impulse response functions also reveal that the e¤ects of macroeconomic shocks to policy instruments are in general long lasting, usually dying out only after two years.
Conclusions
The empirical study presented in this paper focuses on examining monetary policy actions in China. The goal of this exercise is to o¤er information about the monetary policy setting practices of the People's Bank of China. China's case is interesting: along with developments in the surrounding economy, monetary policy is going through a transition from a previous strict implementation of quantity-based policy to a more price-based form of policy conduct. According to our analysis, the actual Chinese data support this story.
We estimate the monetary policy reaction functions for China for the period of 1999-2012. The more recent and higher frequency data utilized in the analysis provide results that are novel to the policy-function estimation literature for China. All the estimated policy rules perform reasonably well in terms of countercyclical policy reactions to in ‡ation and output deviations; or nominal output deviation that is a combination of these two. However, in many instances the sizes of the estimated response coe¢ cients are smaller than those proposed in the literature.
The paper presents detailed analysis of policy responsiveness over time. The overall sensitivity of the policy instruments to macroeconomic variables has increased in recent years. An interesting …nding is that the interest rate has become responsive to the output gap after 2008, whereas prior to that it was unresponsive to all the target variables. Moreover, the money supply instrument has been responsive only to price changes and generally not to the output gap. These results can be seen as a division of policy instruments in a way that di¤erent instruments are directed at di¤erent exclusive targets. The money supply instrument is utilized to control the price level, whereas the interest rate instrument is reserved for achieving the output growth target.
In the last section of the paper, we estimated the monetary policy rule models in a VAR framework. The VAR system allows for more dynamics between monetary policy instruments and macroeconomic target variables. The impulse responses from the VAR models provide further support for our results: in general, the policy instruments react to macroeconomic variables in line with the theoretical assumptions. 
